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Introduction.
The world we live in and our way of life are thoroughly shaped by modern science and technology. 
We tend to think we can be the masters of nature and of our own fate through science and 
technology, believing in progress and a technological solution to everything. At the same time we 
are aware of the numerous side effects of science and technology, for example from environmental 
pollution, the exhaustion of natural resources and alleged climate change to the destruction of 
cultural and biodiversity, diseases of affluence and a perceived dehumanisation of the world we 
live in. The response these side effects provoke is a further progression of science and technology 
to tackle and solve these problems, keeping the illusion of progress alive. But every technological 
application generates new side effects, leading to a vicious circle in which we are held captive. In 
spite of this we persist in our belief in the possibility of the control of nature and in the illusion of 
progress and we carry on as we did before without taking into consideration this vicious circle as a 
possible violation of the illusion of progress.
This appears to be a paradox at the heart of our way of life and consequently of our 
conception of our own identity as human beings. Are we truly the masters and possessors of 
nature, is there really a technological solution to everything and is there indeed progress? My 
suspicion is that this cannot be the right conception of human nature. My suspicion is that the idea 
of being the master and possessor of nature is a mirage which is the result of an institution of 
nature itself, which makes nature rather the master and possessor of the way we think about our 
own identity.
Because this concerns the conception of our own identity my suspicion is philosophically 
relevant. Since Plato philosophy has been about what is-questions, questions about the essence 
and identity of what there is. How can we conceive of our own identity if on the one hand we live in 
the illusion of being the masters and possessors of nature through science and technology and on 
the other hand they bear witness to our being held captive in their vicious circle which the illusion 
seems to blur?
Science itself seems to provide an answer. Evolutionary biology conceives of technology as 
an extended phenotype which is the expression of the human genome as the way in which our 
genes organise their replication through us as their phenotypes and the technological 
transformation of our environment as their extended phenotype.  Our genes drugging us in the 1
illusion of being the masters of our own fate is just a way of enhancing their own replication 
through us as their vehicles. But although science provides this answer it does not make us 
experience our own identity as such. We carry on as we did before. Our conception of ourselves 
has not been changed. How come? This makes me wonder if science is the right method to ask 
and answer the question what it means to be human. As the phenotypical expressions of our 
genome science and technology have already taken the conception of human nature as the master 
and possessor of nature for granted and so keep us captive in their vicious circle which now 
appears to be our inescapable fate, dictated by nature through our genome and its evolutionary 
history in deep time.
Although human technology has been around for as long as humans have been around it 
has become particularly fully fledged since the start of the Scientific Revolution in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century. The philosophical focal point of the Scientific Revolution is Descartes as the 
one who explicitly conceives of the scientific method in which nature appears inert, making it 
possible to conceive of nature as the res extensa as an object for manipulation by the res cogitans 
through quantitative mathematical and mechanical reasoning. Descartes is the one who explicitly 
tells us what the method, nature and human beings are. As such he is philosophically relevant. His 
conception of method, nature and human nature makes him the origin of the idea that the method 
can “nous rendre comme maîtres et possesseurs de la nature”.2
Because of his philosophical relevance Descartes is the subject of this MA-thesis. I will 
demonstrate in my interpretation of Descartes’ thought that Descartes notices that the origin of the 
 Dawkins 1999.1
 AT VI p. 62.2
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method has already been implanted in him as an institution of nature. The guide for my 
interpretation is Descartes’ experience as voiced by him at the beginning of Le Monde:
Me proposant de traiter icy de la Lumiere, la premiere chose dont je veux avertir, 
est, qu’il peut y avoir de la difference entre le sentiment que nous en avons, c’est à 
dire l’idée qui s’en forme en nostre imagination par l’ entremise de nos yeux, & ce 
qui est dans les objets qui produit en nous ce sentiment, c’est à dire ce qui est dans 
la flâme ou dans le Soleil, qui s’ appelle du nom de Lumiere.3
The possibility of the difference he observes between the sentiment and the cause of the 
sentiment is the starting point of his thought as he observes no resemblance at all between 
sentiment and its cause:
Car encore que chacun se persuade communément, que les idées que nous avons 
en nostre pensée sont entierement semblables aux objets dont elles procedent, je 
ne vois point toutefois de raison, qui nous assure que cela soit; mais je remarque, 
au contraire, plusieurs experiences qui nous en doivent faire douter.4
He finds no reason at all for the resemblance, which had traditionally been postulated by 
Aristotelianism between the essence (eidos) and the phenomena to describe and explain them all 
through the method of syllogism, to be assured of the truth. On the contrary, there are many 
experiences which make him doubt this relation.
Instead of Aristotelian resemblance Descartes proposes another relation to conceive of the 
possibility of the difference between the sentiments we experience and their causes: the analogy of 
language which serves as the first example of experiences making him doubt the relation of 
resemblance:
Vous sçavez bien que les paroles, n’ayant aucune ressemblance avec les choses 
qu’elles signifient, ne laissent pas de nous les faire concevoir, & souvent mesme 
sans que nous prenions garde au sons des mots, ny à leurs syllabes; en sorte qu’il 
peut arriver qu’apres avoit ouy un discours, dont nous aurons fort bien compris le 
sens, nous ne pourrons pas dire en quelle langue il aura esté prononcé.5
Descartes continues to explain that words mean something, i.e. that sounds convey 
meaning, because they have been instituted by man without any recourse to resemblance:
Or, si des mots, qui ne signifient rien que par l’institution des hommes, suffisent 
pour nous faire concevoir des choses, avec lesquelles ils n’ont aucune 
ressemblance: (…).6
And now postulates that nature might have done the same as regards the signs which 
convey the meaning of phenomena causing the sentiment in us:
(…) pourquoy la Nature ne pourra-t’elle pas aussi avoir estably certain signe, qui 
nous fasse avoir le sentiment de la Lumiere, bien que ce signe n’ait rien en soy, qui 
soit semblable à ce sentiment?7
 AT XI p. 3.3
 AT XI p. 3-4.4
 AT XI p. 4.5
 Ibid.6
 Ibid.7
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Because nature has already done something similar before:
Et n’est-ce pas ainsi qu’elle a estably les ris & les larmes, pour nous faire lire la joye 
& la tristesse sur le visage des hommes?8
These quotations reflect Descartes’ basic philosophical experience: he experiences himself 
to have already been a part of a thoroughly semantic whole in which signification and interpretation 
have already been going on before he started to think about it. The experience has been bestowed 
on Descartes or rather grew from within. The unity of this semantic whole has been made possible 
by an institution of nature, but in such a way that this unity presents itself as a difference between 
the sensation and the cause of the sensation.
To make sense of this institution he explains the unity in terms of a synthesis of the 
mechanical body mathematically conceived of as an inert res extensa with the rational mind 
metaphysically conceived of as the active res cogitans. Apparently, he sees no way to 
philosophically explain the unity of the semantic institution of nature in its own terms.
By taking this experience as my guide I will interpret Descartes in his own terms, letting him 
speak for himself and not according to some scheme or design to be applied to his thought. I will 
demonstrate how Descartes as a thinking entity himself as instituted by nature is already involved 
in the object of his thought: nature.
Taking this as his starting point Descartes already uses the perception which nature has 
instituted. At the same time this leads to the conception of an inert nature, forgetting the very origin 
of the conception. The paradox which is the hallmark of our modern conception of our identity finds 
its origin in Descartes’ thought, the very origin of modern science and technology.
As Descartes himself states: human nature can neither be conceived of in terms of the 
soul, i.e. metaphysics, nor of the body, i.e. mathematical physics. It can only be conceived of 
unphilosophically in terms of itself as the union it is, i.e. in terms of everyday sensual experience.  9
A philosophical conception of being human as the semantic unity is impossible, because existence 
itself on its own does not affect us: what a being, i.e. a substance, is is known only through its 
attributes.10
So Cartesian thought, including the modern scientific method, is inept to conceive of the 
true identity of human nature. How then to philosophically conceive of human nature?
§ 1 The epistemic gap.
The experience of being part of a semantic whole which presents itself as a difference between 
sensation and the cause of the sensation is the core around which Descartes’ thought precipitates. 
Desmond Clarke calls this difference an epistemic gap between subjective experience and their 
objective causes which Descartes bridges by a new scientific strategy which Clarke calls 
hypothesis.  What does this mean?11
Descartes’ thought is motivated by his experience of the world as a semantic unity 
displaying a difference between sensation and the cause of sensation which cannot be bridged by 
reference to resemblance. In other words, the nature and identity of things in the world as we 
experience them cannot be explained anymore in terms of resemblance like Aristotle’s eidos did. 
Clarke incorrectly interprets the quoted passage from Le Monde as discussing “the unreliability of 
 Ibid.8
 AT III p. 690-695: Descartes to Elizabeth, 28 June 1643.9
 AT VIII p. 25.10
 Cottingham 1992 p. 261.11
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our sensations as a basis for scientific knowledge”.  However, this is not Descartes’ point.  12 13
According to Descartes there is nothing wrong with our everyday experience of the world.  On the 14
contrary, it serves as the basis for the refutation of the relation of resemblance as the rationale for 
explanation of our sensations.15
A gap has been opened which cannot be bridged by resemblance anymore. Descartes 
needs something else to explain the way in which we experience the world, because the world has 
grown beyond the resemblance between our sensations and their causes. Man is not at home 
anymore in the world in which his experience resembled the world he experienced. A micro and 
macrocosmos reveal themselves in the gap that has been opened. A start of the exploration of the 
microcosmos had already been made in the form of corpuscular mechanics by Isaac Beeckman, 
whose apprentice Descartes had been.  A start of the exploration of the macrocosmos had been 16
made by Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo and would soon get its most advanced form in the theory 
of gravitation of Isaac Newton, who would acknowledge his indebtedness to Descartes.17
Descartes bridges the gap by the construction of corpuscular mechanical models serving 
as hypotheses to explain all natural phenomena. Nature is conceived of as corpuscular matter  18
and as acting according to mechanical rules.  Mechanics is conceived of as different parts of the 19
same whole acting in the same way upon each other. In this way all there is can be explained in 
terms of the speed and direction of the motion of the constituent particles.20
Necessary for the mechanisation is the concept of inertia to ensure the uniform analysis of 
all the different parts in a reduction to speed and motion of smaller particles constituting the bigger 
 Cottingham 1992 p. 260.12
 Descartes’ point is clear in the third meditation, for example AT VII p. 39 makes Descartes’ point very clear: “Ac 13
denique, quamvis a rebus a me diversis procederent, non inde sequitur illas rebus istis similes esse debere. Quinimo in 
multis saepe magnum discrimen videor deprehendisse: ut, exempli causa, duas diversis solis ideas apud me invenio, 
unam tanquam a sensibus haustam, & quae maxime inter illas quas adventitias existimo est recensenda, per quam mihi 
valde parvus apparet, aliam vero ex rationibus Astronomiae desumptam, hoc est ex notionibus quibusdam mihi innatis 
elicitam, vel quocumque alio modo a me factam, per quam aliquoties major quam terra exhibetur; utraque profecto similis 
eidem soli extra me existenti esse non potest, & ratio persuadet illam ei maxime esse dissimilem, quae quam proxime ab 
ipso videtur emanasse.” [my italics] The point is not that sensations are unreliable, but that they are incomplete: they are 
to be complemented by reason. This will also be discussed in § 4 and 5.
 Rather there can be something wrong with the inclinations (impetus) we have to draw particular conclusions from 14
everyday experience: AT VII p. 38-39: “sed quantum ad impetus naturales, jam saepe olim judicavi me ab illis in 
deteriorem partem fuisse impulsum, cum de bono eligendo ageretur”, or with the judgments (judicia) we base on 
everyday experience: AT VII p. 76: “Postea vero multa paulatim experimenta fidem omnem quam sensibus habueram 
labefactarunt; (…) & talibus aliis innumeris in rebus sensuum externorum judicia falli deprehendebam”. Again, see also § 
4 and 5.
 AT XI p. 3-4: “mais je remarque, au contraire, plusieurs experiences qui nous en [que les idées que nous avons en 15
nostre pensée sont entierement semblables aux objets dont elles procedent] doivent faire douter” and Descartes 
continues to give some everyday examples, like language (as already quoted above: AT XI p. 4), the tickling sensation 
caused by a feather (AT XI p. 5-6) and the sensation of a strap by a soldier (AT XI p. 6).
 Van Berkel 2013.16
 Gleick 2004 p. 100 quotes Newton’s letter to Hooke dated February 5, 1676: “What Des-Cartes did was a good step. 17
(…) If I have seen further it is by standing on the sholders of Giants”. And Cohen and Whitman 1999 p. 43-48 where it is 
explained that the title of Newton’s Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica is an allusion to Descartes’ Principia 
philosophiae and how Newton derived many of his concepts and phrasings from Descartes, including the important 
concept of inertia which will be discussed below.
 AT XI p. 33-34 and p. 37.18
 AT VI p. 54: “selon les règles des mécaniques, qui sont les mêmes que celles de la nature”.19
 AT VIII p. 52-53 and AT XI p. 34.20
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parts constituting the whole.  Inertia ensures that no final recourse is needed to qualitatively 21
different Aristotelian eidè which natural phenomena as the objects of study resemble. Inertia 
ensures that every particle can be treated in the same quantitative way, because the difference is 
not in the nature of different particles, but in their amount of speed and their amount of direction in 
the three spatial dimensions of motion.
The essential thing about inertia is that it deprives particles of an active quality of their own 
as their own source of action or principle of motion (eidos as archè tès kinèseoos).  Inertia only 22
admits an external force to activate particles, i.e. particles acting on each other through direct 
contact to transfer the motion, and so only admits the efficient cause. Through mechanics the 
significance and purpose of a functional whole can be explained in terms of the different parts 
acting effectively on each other, so the traditional final cause is eliminated in its reduction to the 
efficient cause. Conceived of as mechanised, corpuscular, material and inert nature is deprived of 
its own meaningful and purposeful activity. The identity and essence of nature has become inertia. 
The identity of the ultimate external power source, the very origin of all motion imposed on matter, 
has become something supernatural, i.e. metaphysical: God.  To bridge the epistemic gap 23
Descartes has opened another gap: an ontological one in the essence of nature: between nature 
as inert mechanised corpuscular matter and nature as God the supernatural power source.
The conception of inert nature should not be confused with the Aristotelian-Scholastic 
notion of the prima materia. The prima materia of Aristotelian Scholasticism is matter deprived of 
its imprinted qualities and forms without an essence of its own. Descartes positively conceives of 
corpuscular matter as a true body which can be geometrically conceived according to its length, 
breadth and depth.  The geometrical conception of the body implies its infinite divisibility in ever 24
smaller particles.  As such the essence of matter can never be found in a certain indivisible 25
particle or atom with qualities of its own. Its essence is to be found in its being an infinitely divisible 
body occupying the geometrically analysable space. The essence of corpuscular, material nature is 
to be found in its geometrical conception as a res extensa. This is where inertia and geometry 
meet as the two cardinal aspects of mechanised nature. At this junction of inertia and geometry we 
can ask ourselves what the origin is of Descartes’ idea of the mechanisation of nature.
 Descartes was not an atomist in the strict sense and argues against atomism in article 20 of the second part of the 21
Principia (AT VIII p. 51-52), because of the divisibility of the res extensa, but acknowledges it as a means to the 
mechanical understanding of natural phenomena. The real existence of atoms is not essential to the understanding of 
natural phenomena, only the uniform divisibility of particles as res extensa is, in order that all natural phenomena can be 
uniformly analysed. Particles being res extensa implies the impossibility of being atoms (“Cognoscimus etiam fieri non 
posse ut aliquae atomi, sive materiae partes ex natura sua indivisibiles, existant. Cum enim, si quae sint, necessario 
debeant esse extensae, quantumvis parvae fingantur, possumus adhuc unamque ex ipsis in duas aut plures minores 
cogitatione dividere, ac proinde agnoscere esse divisibiles.” [my italics]). This does not exclude the hypothesis of atomic 
particles to function “for the occasion” in specific scientific questions to be solved, as long as they only function as the 
basic unit to which speed and direction of motion are to be assigned needed to explain a specific bigger structure.
 I will not engage in a thorough discussion of the concept of inertia from Beeckman through Descartes to Newton, 22
because this paper is a philosophical thesis and not one of history of science. The essence of the concept of inertia is the 
same for Beeckman, Descartes and Newton, though phrasings differ. For in depth discussions as regards Descartes see 
Cottingham 1992 chapter 10 (by Daniel Garber), Gaukroger 1980 chapter 10 (by Alan Gabbey), Gaukroger 1995 p. 
237-249 and 368-369 and Schmalz 2008 chapter 3.
 AT VIII p. 61-62 and AT XI p. 34.23
 AT XI p. 33: “Et ne pensons pas aussi d’ autre costé qu’ elle soit cette Matiere premiere des Philosophes, qu’ on a si 24
bien dépouillée de toutes ses Formes & Qualitez, qu’ il n’ y est rien demeuré de reste, qui puisse estre clairement 
entendu. Mais concevons-la comme un vray corps, parfaitement solide, qui remplit également toutes les longueurs, 
largeurs, & profondeurs (…)”.
 AT VIII p. 51- 52 (see note 20), p. 59-60 and AT XI p. 33-34.25
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§ 2 Mathematics as rhetorics.
The world has outgrown man and a gap has opened between man and a vast universe revealing 
itself as an infinite micro and macrocosmos not resembling man’s ideas about it anymore. But 
being part of this infinitely bigger new world Descartes still senses the unity, though it cannot be 
expressed as resemblance between human experience and its causing phenomena in the world 
anymore. The fundamental experience of the gap is the fundamental motivation of Descartes’ 
thought. Descartes’ answer to this existential challenge  is counting and calculating thought, i.e. 26
mathematics. This is not something he made up himself, no creatio ex nihilo. According to 
Descartes it was already there: in his inborn natural constitution (ingenium), the seeds of true 
knowledge waiting to be developed in the right methodical way. Nature as the infinite cosmos may 
have outgrown man, but has also given man the means to grow and to try to keep up with nature’s 
growth through the development of man’s inborn natural constitution. This is what Descartes 
senses due to the natural light (lumen naturale) illuminating his inborn natural constitution.
Descartes finds the language and demonstrations of mathematicians much clearer than the 
language and syllogisms of the Scholastic philosophers who are supposed to explain what things 
really are, but never seem to agree about anything and losing themselves in endless disputes.  27
Descartes takes this simple finding at face value: apparently mathematics is much more 
illuminated by a natural light than Scholastic philosophy and is to be considered as a spontaneous 
gift of nature to the human mind.  Then we should not follow the Scholastic philosophers, but 28
follow the natural light illuminating our inborn human constitution and think according to this light 
and leave the School philosophers and their language to themselves. This naturally illuminated 
way of thinking is ordering everything by counting and calculating, considering everything 
according to its order and measure (ordo vel mensura; rapport ou proportion; en nombre, en pois, 
& en mesure), just like mathematics, irrespective of the nature of the subject at hand, whether we 
are dealing with stars or humans.  In this way everything can be considered in the same 29
methodical way.  What things are should not be explained by their essences or other occult 30
qualities through lengthy syllogisms, but according to a progression in which one thing is known 
through another.  The identity of things should be classified through their knowability and not 31
through their essence. Thenceforth traditional ontology will be replaced by epistemology. In this 
way Descartes forges a new method for the search of truth by the formulation of rules for the 
cultivation of the human mind.32
These rules are not designed to prescribe the mind how to think, because the way in which 
the mind thinks, i.e. performs inference, is inborn and has come naturally to the mind: which is the 
whole point of Descartes’ criticism of Scholasticism and its syllogisms which strike him as 
unnatural and unproductive. Descartes wants to demonstrate how the human mind naturally thinks. 
The rules formalise what naturally happens when humans start to think, formalising the nature of 
 That it is an existential challenge indeed to Descartes will be discussed in § 6.26
 AT VI p. 7-8; AT X p. 362-366; AT XI p. 39.27
 AT X p. 373 and p. 376; AT XI p. 47.28
 AT VI p. 7-8 and p. 17-20; AT X p. 377-378; AT XI p. 47.29
 Initially Descartes conceived of this as a “universal mathematics” (Mathesis universalis; AT X p. 378), but never used 30
this term again, because soon afterwards he realised that there was much more to it than just a new mathematical 
discipline: it signifies nothing less than a complete and fundamental reform and transformation of science and human 
knowledge by the newly found method, as discussed in depth by John Schuster in Gaukroger 1980 chapter 3 and by 
Stephen Gaukroger in Gaukroger 1995 chapter 4; also compare AT VI p. 19-21 and AT X p. 179.
 AT VI p. 18-21; AT X p. 381.31
 Initially the extended Regulae ad directionem ingenii, but later presented in much more compact form in the four rules 32
of the Discours de la Méthode: AT VI p. 18-19.
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truth in clarity and distinctness of conception and aiming at the continuous cultivation of the human 
mind from its natural origin.33
What is so special about mathematics that Descartes takes this as the paradigm of human 
knowledge illuminated by the natural light? The basic concepts of mathematics are clearly and 
distinctly known through their illumination by the natural light and as such known in an indubitable 
way. This being the case, so are the chains of reasoning resulting from them, if performed 
correctly. When one understands a mathematical concept or follows a chain of correct 
mathematical reasoning one cannot but consent to it, forestalling any doubt about them and any 
endless dispute about the truth (in which the School philosophers revelled). Mathematical concepts 
and reasoning convey certainty by means of clear and distinct concepts and reasoning.
Mathematics can be applied to inert corpuscular nature, because the clear and distinct 
conception of it in its geometrical guise is in mathematical form. All particles and so all bigger 
functional structures which they constitute can be mathematically expressed according to their 
order and measure as regards speed and direction of motion.
It is important to note that the certainty itself which is conveyed by mathematical reasoning 
is nothing mathematical, but something empirical, i.e. something that is felt, perceived. Descartes’ 
point is that the clarity and distinctness of a mathematical concept or deduction is the illumination 
by the natural light.  Once you have hit the ground with a clear and distinct intuition  it is 34 35
amenable to mathematical deduction conveying the illumination by the natural light to everything 
that is rigorously deduced from it.  Mathematics is just the medium for conveying certainty, i.e. 36
 AT X p. 372-373. Here I largely concur with Gaukroger 1995 p. 116-117, though perhaps I state the case more 33
explicitly than he does by calling the rules a formalisation and not just “[the] capture [of] an internal process”.
 AT X p. 366-370. Again, I largely concur with Gaukroger 1995 p. 123, though again I state the case more explicitly 34
than he does by calling mathematics a medium and not just a model like he does. Certainty being nothing mathematical 
is also demonstrated by the fact that mathematical truths and concepts can be called into doubt: see AT VII p. 20-21 and 
AT VIII p. 6, and by the empirical-perceptional and non-mathematical nature of truth as certainty: see note 35.
 According to Descartes the ultimate unshakeable ground and indubitable intuition is the clear and distinct insight i.e. 35
illumination that I am the one illuminated by the natural light, whatever the status of the intuited insight is, indicating that 
at least I am something: the (in)famous cogito sum (AT VI p. 32-33; AT VII p. 24-25; AT VIII p. 8). As the truth of this 
intuition is guaranteed by nothing else than being a clear and distinct perception clarity and distinctness serve as the 
criterion for truth (AT VII p. 35: “Nunquid ergo etiam scio quid requiratur ut de aliqua re sim certus? Nempe in hac prima 
cognitione nihil aliud est, quam clara quaedam & distincta perceptio ejus quod affirmo; quae sane non sufficeret ad me 
certum de rei veritate reddendum, si posset unquam contingere, ut aliquid, quod ita clare & distincte perciperem, falsum 
est; ac proinde jam videor pro regula generali posse statuere, illud omne esse verum, quod valde clare & distincte 
percipio.”), again underlining the non-mathematical, but empirical nature of truth as certainty. The guarantee that every 
insight I have remains true when I do not attend to it (which means that propositions I have clearly and distinctly intuited 
keep their identity as such, which means that the natural light always illuminates the human mind in the same way, which 
means that nature can be counted on to be regular) is God who is not a deceiver (quod Deus non sit fallax: AT VII p. 80 
and 90; AT VIII p. 21). See also § 7.
 Gaukroger complains about Descartes’ treatment of the distinction between intuition and deduction as being “rather 36
puzzling” (Gaukroger 1995, p. 117), because the concepts of intuition and deduction themselves are not clearly and 
distinctly distinguished by Descartes. I do not agree: it is clear from AT X p. 370 that deduction is the medium to convey 
the evidence (evidentia) of the intuition by means of a sequence (successio). So there cannot be a clear and distinct 
difference between the two, because as a medium to transmit and propagate the natural light they are both of the same 
kind and the difference between them can only be gradual and not discrete. The intuitions represent the first contact with 
the truth, not mediated by a sequence of deductions stored in memory. The deductions represent the transmission and 
propagation of the natural light of the truth. In this way it is perfectly clear what Descartes means by “Ex quibus colligitur, 
dici posse illas quidem propositiones, quae ex primis principiis immediate concluduntur, sub diversa consideratione, 
modo per intuitum, modo per deductionem cognosci; ipsa autem prima principia, per intuitum tantum; & contra remotas 
conclusiones, non nisi per deductionem.” Asking for a sharp distinction between intuition and deduction would thus be 
contradictory to rule 7 (AT X p. 387). Ultimately, Gaukroger also reluctantly concludes “that deduction is ultimately 
modelled on intuition, and that in the limiting case it becomes intuition.” (Gaukroger 1995 p. 118.)
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truth. Mathematics is the medium for the transmission and the propagation of the natural light. As 
such it is a medium for rhetorical persuasion.37
As the medium of the natural light mathematics is able to display concepts and deductions 
with such clarity and vividness that one cannot but consent to it. The clarity and vividness of a 
presented image illuminated by the natural light is the ultimate rhetorical persuasion for Descartes, 
as argued by Stephen Gaukroger. He draws attention to two central features as regards Descartes 
and his concept of truth. The first is historical in pointing out the important role rhetorics, especially 
that of Quintilian, must have played in Descartes’ education at La Flêche and how rhetorics as 
conceived by Quintilian depends on exhibiting images in a vivid way to convince another of the 
truth.  The second is philosophical in the idea of an image-forming power being at the centre of 38
cognition as the dominant one for Descartes.39
Again, it is important to realise that mathematics itself is not the source of knowledge and 
the truth, just as certainty being the mark of truth is nothing mathematical. Mathematics is the 
medium to transmit the truth by propagating the natural light. The source of knowledge is the 
image-forming force (vis imaginationis) which educes the divine seeds of knowledge which are in 
us like the sparks educed from a flintstone. The image-forming force is primarily attributed to poetry 
by Descartes as being brighter than philosophy and called enthusiasm.  Philosophy educes the 40
seeds through reason (ratio).41
Though Gaukroger draws attention to the all-important rhetorical aspects of Descartes’ 
concept of truth in clear and distinct ideas being absolutely certain as the expression of the image-
forming power as the source of knowledge he does not explain the connection between 
philosophical reason and poetic imagination. In what way is the image-forming force at the centre 
of cognition and is philosophical reason an expression of it as well?
§ 3 Algebra as formalisation.
My suggestion is, like Gaukroger’s, that Descartes realised that the image-forming force is also at 
the heart of reason. However, the force is ultimately not forming images to constitute a concept by 
a relation of resemblance. My next suggestion, beyond Gaukroger’s, is, that Descartes realises 
how a form can signify something it does not resemble, as explained in the introduction and which 
he already realises very early on as evidenced by his early manuscript Cogitationes privatae as 
copied by Leibniz:
Vt imaginatio vtitur figuris ad corpora concipienda, ita intellectus vtitur quibusdam 
corporibus sensibilibus ad spiritualia figuranda, vt vento, lumine: vnde altius 
philosophantes mentem cognitione possumus in sublime tollere.42
 AT VI p. 7: “Ceux qui ont le raisonnement le plus fort, et qui digèrent le mieux leurs pensées, afin de les rendre claires 37
et intelligibles, peuvent toujours le mieux persuader ce qu’ ils proposent, encore qu’ ils ne parlassent que bas breton, et 
qu’ ils n’ eussent jamais appris de rhétorique.”
 Quintilian, Institutionis oratoriae VIII, III, XLI: “Ornatum est quod perspicuo ac probabili plus est. Eius primi sunt gradus 38
in eo quod velis exprimendo, tertius qui haec nitidiora faciat, quod proprie dixeris cultum. Itaque enargeian, cuius in 
praeceptis narrationis feci mentionem, quia plus est evidentia vel, ut alii dicunt, repraesentatio quam perspicuitas, et illud 
patet, hoc se quodam modo ostendit, inter ornamenta ponamus.” [my italics] Quoted in English translation by Gaukroger 
in Gaukroger 1995 p. 123.
 Gaukroger 1995 p. 119-124.39
 Enthusiasm is a significant term in the history of philosophy, Plato’s account of it in Phaedrus 244a-249d being the 40
classic one and extending beyond Descartes to Nietzsche. I will not explore this topic for reasons of restrictions in 
subject and size.
 AT X p. 184 and p. 217.41
 AT X p. 217.42
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But though Descartes suspects this possibility very early on he does not fully realise it from 
the beginning: it will take him some years to conceive of its full potential and develop the method 
accordingly, as will be explained in § 5.
 Because Descartes rejects the relation of resemblance he conceives of the possibility of 
abstract symbolic representation as a way of conception. In other words: the true nature of reason 
as animated by the image-forming force is its formalising power, i.e. its ability to represent 
knowledge in an abstract formalised way. Aristotelian logic in the guise of syllogism knew only one 
way of formalised thought which could be applied to nature: by means of the relation of 
resemblance between my ideas and the things in the world generating these ideas through the 
senses. Descartes abandons resemblance in the formalisation and opens up the possibility of 
abstract symbolic representation of nature in the guise of algebraic mathematics, eventually 
reducing figurative geometry to algebra.43
In this way it is possible to abstract from the particular natures of the objects of knowledge 
to their common and most general aspect: order and measure, as already explained in § 2. It is this 
most general aspect of things which should be considered in science in distinction to the variety of 
things (varietas rerum), if one wants to know the truth (veritas rerum), because only this most 
general aspect is amenable to mathematical treatment and so known with certainty. This most 
general aspect of all there is is what constitutes the unity of human knowledge.44
The unity of human knowledge is not to be found in the resemblance between my ideas 
and the world anymore, but in the uniform methodical way of thinking all there is through the 
equality expressed through algebraic equations expressing the quantitative relations between 
different quantities. The quantitative relations expressed through algebraic equations represent the 
causal-mechanical structure of nature in which all natural phenomena are quantitatively analysed 
and expressed in terms of speed and direction of motion. The conception of the mechanical 
structure of nature as causality is matched by the conception of the mechanical structure of 
scientific knowledge as algebra.45
Human knowledge is not changed by the variety of the objects of knowledge, but remains 
one and the same, like the light of the sun is not changed by the things it shines upon. The unity of 
human scientific knowledge is universal and its importance is in its contribution to the universal 
wisdom (universalis Sapientia) and not in its contributions to particular specialist sciences.  So the 46
human mind is a universal instrument (instrument universel), not dependent on the particular 
corporeal dispositions to exercise a particular art or trade.  As such the human mind, considering 47
 As evidenced by La Geometrie in which geometry is expressed through algebraic equations for the first time in the 43
history of mathematics and by Descartes’ introduction of a new algebraic notation replacing the old Cossic notation. 
Gaukroger also suggests that Descartes’ fully developed conception of the limits of figurative representation by means of 
geometry (as opposed to the much more powerful possibilities of a symbolic calculus, i.e. algebra) led him to abandon 
the completion of the Regulae: see Gaukroger 1995 p. 172-181. See also § 5.
 AT VI p. 19-21; AT X p. 359-379.44
 The mechanical character of algebra is fully realised by Leibniz who was amazed to find how complicated calculations 45
did not need any thinking at all, but automatically propagated themselves through algebraic notation. This led him to the 
idea of an Encyclopaedia of human knowledge which could be formalised into a Characteristica universalis to which a 
Calculus ratiocinator could be applied to solve all scientific problems. A Machina arithmetica could do the job, so human 
beings would be delivered from the slave labour of calculation and could solely engage in creative thought. See Davis 
2011 chapter 1, Hoffmann 2013 p. 32 and G 7 p. 200: “Quo facto, quando orientur controversiae, non magis disputatione 
opus erit inter duos philosophos, quam inter duos Computistas. Sufficiet enim calamos in manus sumere sedereque ad 
abacos, et sibi mutuo (accito si placet amico): calculemus.”
 AT X p. 359-360.46
 AT VI p. 56-59; AT X p. 359-360.47
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everything there is in its universal aspect according to order and measure by means of calculating 
thought expressed in algebraic equations, is a universal computer.48
But universal wisdom is not a purpose in itself. Scientific knowledge is not designed to 
solve some school problems by arm-chair scholars, but to provide the knowledge necessary to 
know what choices should be made in life. To achieve this the natural light of reason must grow.  49
The rules and their expositions in the Regulae and the three Essais and their accompanying 
introduction about method, the Discours, are the means by which Descartes shows the way how to 
make the natural light grow by cultivating the naturally inborn human constitution which already 
harbours the divine seeds of knowledge. In this way man can master his own life and overcome 
nature.
§ 4 Representation.
The causal structure of nature is represented by the algebraic structure of human thought. What 
does “representation” mean? At the beginning of Le Monde Descartes already mentions the 
representation by the mind of the ideas of natural phenomena as the place where the meaning 
which is signified by the action of the natural phenomena on our senses is to be found:
Mais vous direz, peut-estre, que nos oreilles ne nous font veritablement sentir que 
le son des paroles, ny nos yeux que la contenance de celuy qui rit ou qui pleure, & 
que c’est nostre esprit, qui ayant retenu ce que signifient ces paroles & cette 
contenance, nous le represente en mesme temps. A cela je pourrois répondre que 
c’est nostre esprit tout de mesme, qui nous represente l’ idée de la Lumiere, toutes 
les fois que l’ action qui la signifie touche nostre oeil.50
But Descartes merely touches upon the topic and does not want to lose time by discussing 
it:
Mais sans perdre le temps à disputer, j’ auray plutost fait d’ apporter un autre 
exemple.51
Le Monde is primarily a work explaining his new corpuscular physics in a popular way, i.e. 
in French instead of Latin and like a story (Fable) instead of by mathematical analysis and 
demonstration. His sole intention here is to point the way by which everyone can find the exact 
mathematical demonstrations of natural phenomena himself.  So ultimately Le Monde has the 52
same function as the Regulae and the Discours and its Essais (for the same reasons written in 
French rather than Latin  and, in the case of the Discours, but not its Essais, like a story (comme 53
une histoire; comme une fable) ): to show the way how to make the natural light grow, i.e. the 54
cultivation of the ingenium.
 Descartes foreshadowed the work of Alan Turing by almost exactly 300 years (Descartes’ Discours was published in 48
1637, Turing’s On computable numbers in 1936). The connection between Descartes and Turing is of paramount 
importance and has scarcely been explored so far in philosophical and mathematical literature.
 AT VI p. 9-10; AT X p. 361.49
 AT XI p. 4.50
 AT XI p. 4-5.51
 AT XI p. 31 and p. 48.52
 AT VI p. 77-78.53
 AT VI p. 4.54
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But this does not eliminate the problem at hand: what is representation? One way or the 
other and one time or the other Descartes is obliged to explain what representation is. The problem 
of representation is the problem of the contact between the world and its natural phenomena and 
the human mind through the senses. Descartes is obliged to explain why man is a semantic being 
in the first place, i.e. is in the world and experiences the world, interpreting the significations of 
phenomena.
Descartes cannot use his corpuscular and mathematical physics to account for this. His 
physiology, including his description and explanation of the process of cognition , is thoroughly 55
mechanistic and as such can only explain the process of cognition in causal-mechanical terms, 
ultimately to be expressed in mathematical form. It does not show what thought is and how one 
knows it to be true. Accepting the mechanistic conception of nature and its algebraic expression is 
taking the basic fact of this conception and its expression already for granted, no questions asked. 
A scientist can do this and rather should do this to succeed in the endeavour of scientific research, 
but a philosopher cannot do this and has to consider the basic fact that causality itself is already a 
conception and so cannot be used to explain what conception is. Descartes realises the 
impossibility of a mechanical reduction of thought which can be mathematically expressed when he 
realises that the truth is nothing mathematical, but clarity and distinctness of conception due to the 
illumination of the mind by the natural light.56
Man as the focal point of thought reveals himself to Descartes as a unity of something 
which can be mechanically and mathematically conceived of as an extended thing (res extensa) 
and non-mechanically and metaphysically as a thinking thing (res cogitans). So the unity that man 
is is, for Descartes, fundamentally a synthesis. This begs the question: who or what put both 
together? Descartes merely calls the synthesis an institution of nature (institution de la Nature)  or 57
constituted by God (natura hominis a Deo sic constitui) , but that begs the question what kind of 58
nature Descartes has in mind here, because, for obvious reasons, it cannot be the mechanistically 
conceived and mathematically expressed inert nature. Invoking God merely shifts the problem, for 
now Descartes has to explain the relation between the non-mechanical nature of God as the 
ultimate power source and mechanical nature.
The question concerning human nature as a synthesis will later be dealt with. For now it is 
important to bring to attention that Descartes uses representation to explain how natural 
phenomena signify themselves through the senses to the mind. Descartes discusses 
representation in the context of his first proof of the existence of God in the third meditation, but his 
point is to find a way to discuss how things distinct from me can cause my ideas, including God 
causing my idea of a supreme being. Proving the existence of God and him not being a deceiver is 
the foundation of corporeal things causing my ideas, because God has created me in such a way 
as a composite being capable of knowing the truth through illumination by the natural light.  Of 59
course, in the context of the subject of this thesis I will not concentrate on the proof of God’s 
existence in the third meditation and this serving as the foundation for corporeal things being the 
cause of my ideas in the sixth meditation, but I will concentrate on the way something different 
from the thinking substance can cause the ideas of the thinking substance.
 As evidenced in both the second part of Le Monde (Traité de l’ Homme) and Les passions de l’ âme.55
 Even when Turing reduces calculating thought to a mechanical process performed by a universal machine (in On 56
computable numbers) in which thought can be algebraically expressed as instructions to be performed and so opens up 
the possibility of understanding organic intelligence and thought as a mechanical process (in computer science (artificial 
intelligence) and in neurophysiology: for a nice overview see Dennett 1993) this still concerns a certain conception of 
what might be called thought, namely the counting and calculating one. It still does not say what thought is as such. To 
say it Descartes-like: the light that illuminates Turing’s mind and which enables him to experience the world and see its 
phenomena for what they are is nothing mechanical, but something semantic and eludes every reduction. However, if 
one would like to speak of it one needs another method of expression than the mathematical one.
 AT VI p. 130 and p. 137; AT XI p. 357 and p. 369.57
 AT VII p. 8858
 AT VII p. 71-90.59
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Again, the motivating experience for Descartes is the difference between my ideas and 
their causes and the breakdown of resemblance. After establishing beyond doubt me being a 
thinking substance (ego sum res cogitans) in the second meditation Descartes establishes 
perceptions as modes of thinking as being beyond doubt.  But though I am certain of my 60
perceptions I cannot be certain about there being things distinct from me producing these ideas 
and resembling them in every way.  I might be of such a nature (created by God) that I could be 61
wrong all the time, but even if that would be the case I cannot go wrong when I turn to the things I 
clearly and distinctly perceive themselves and being convinced by them perceive that even if I 
might be deceived I cannot be deceived in the perception that I am something as long as I think I 
am something.  This being the case Descartes has to investigate whether God exists and if he 62
does if he could be a deceiver, which amounts to the question whether the naturally inborn human 
constitution could be erroneously created by nature, thus rendering the illumination by the natural 
light as misleading.
To answer this question Descartes distinguishes two kinds of ideas to discover which kind 
can be true or false. Ideas can be divided into images of things (rerum imagines) and having other 
forms as being volitions, emotions or judgments. He establishes judgments (judicia) as the ones 
which can be falsified. The most frequently made false judgment consists in thinking that my ideas 
resemble things distinct from me.  What is the reason (ratio) for thinking this? Apparently, nature 63
has taught (doctus a natura) us to think this way and it has not been shown by the natural light to 
be true.  But what has been shown by the natural light is true (as established by the cogito sum) 64
whereas the judgment made on natural impulses taught by nature can push us in the wrong 
direction.  For example, we can have two different ideas of the sun: one drawn from the senses by 65
which the sun appears very small and one from astronomical reasoning by which the sun is shown 
to be larger than the earth. Both ideas cannot resemble the sun and reason persuades us that the 
idea which seems to be drawn from the sun most directly bears no resemblance to it at all.  Ideas 66
are not formed on the basis of the senses alone (per organa sensuum), but also on the basis of 
reason (ratio), because something more than just resemblance is involved (aliquid etiam amplius 
quam istius rei similitudinem cogitatione complector).  But how can one investigate this?67
Here Descartes sees another way of investigating whether the things of which I have ideas 
exist distinct from me. In so far as ideas are considered as modes of thought I cannot recognize 
any inequality among them, but in so far as ideas represent different things they differ widely.  68
Descartes proceeds to explain this by differences in the amount of reality contained in ideas 
according to what ideas represent: ideas representing substances contain more reality than the 
ones representing attributes. To make his point he seems to invoke several technical Scholastic 
distinctions, which might strike the reader as odd, because Descartes is the philosopher who 
criticizes Scholastic philosophy for not being a natural and productive way of thinking. It has led to 
controversy and confusion, from the first readers, like Thomas Hobbes in the third set of objections 
 AT VII p. 34-35.60
 AT VII p. 35: similes translated as semblables in the French translation authorized by Descartes (AT IX p. 28), the 61
same word used by Descartes in Le Monde.
 AT VII p. 36.62
 AT VII p. 37: again similes translated as semblables (AT IX p. 29).63
 AT VII p. 38: again similes translated as semblables and similitudo as ressemblance (AT IX p. 30), also used by 64
Descartes in Le Monde.
 AT VII p. 38-39 and see note 14.65
 AT VII p. 39 and see note 13.66
 AT VII p. 37 and 40.67
 AT VII p. 40.68
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to Descartes’ Meditationes , to modern commentators like Bernard Williams who calls it “a piece 69
of scholastic metaphysics” which is “unblinkingly accept[ed]” by Descartes though “a barely 
comprehensible principle as self-evident in the light of reason”.70
The question is whether it is that simple. Undoubtedly, Descartes took care to present his 
philosophy in the Meditationes in the most acceptable way to the traditional Aristotelians of 
Scholastic philosophy and the officials of the Roman Catholic Church,  at pains to escape 71
Galileo’s fate.  Invoking traditional philosophical distinctions might do the trick, but what trick is 72
Descartes exactly pulling here?
First, Descartes uses the old principle that something cannot come from nothing (nec posse 
aliquid a nihilo fieri): if an idea representing something contains reality the reality must come from 
somewhere, i.e. its cause, and if one idea represents something containing more reality than 
another thing represented by another idea it is due to their respective causes. According to 
Descartes this is the case for effects containing ‘actual or formal reality’ as well as ideas 
considering their ‘objective reality’.73
Then, based on this principle, Descartes explains that the reality of an idea as an idea is 
derived from my thought, but as an idea representing something its reality is derived from 
something else. Though the cause of this idea representing something else is not transferring its 
own reality to my thought in the idea (ista causa nihil de sua realitate in meam ideam transfundat) it 
must not be thought that it must be less real (non ideo putandum est illam minus realem esse 
debere). An idea’s own nature is such that it derives its reality from thought as being a mode of it, 
but being a representation of something it derives its reality from some other cause.74
What is Descartes doing here? Is he really unblinkingly accepting some unintuitive and 
incomprehensible principle and reanimating Scholasticism? The basic thing about Descartes is that 
he experiences the gap between the world and his thinking about it. My ideas do not resemble the 
phenomena they convey to my mind. Descartes realises: I am not, or rather: my thought is not of 
the same kind, or rather: of the same substance as the world and its phenomena, though I am 
evidently already in the world and part of it, because I experience myself as being such due to the 
natural light illuminating me. Me being of another substance than the world does not mean that the 
world is less real than I am or not real at all. Me already being in the world there already is a 
connection between my thought and natural phenomena, though we are not of the same 
substance and as such are a different res, i.e. of different reality. So my ideas as modes of thought 
cannot be of the same substance and have the same reality as the phenomena in the world: my 
ideas represent the phenomena, for they are not the same as them in substance.
Now it becomes clear that Descartes’ invocation of traditional Scholastic distinctions is 
nothing very essential to his own way of thinking: rather, he seems to turn Scholasticism inside out 
and putting the traditional distinctions to his own use, demonstrating his independence of rather 
than dependence on Scholasticism.  But this can only become clear in the natural light 75
illuminating the experience of the world being a divided unity of two different things: my thought 
and the natural phenomena it thinks. Williams has missed Descartes’ basic experience as the 
 AT VII p. 185.69
 Williams 2005 p. 120.70
 See the introductory letter of Descartes in the Meditationes to the theologians of the Sorbonne: AT VII p. 1-6.71
 Galileo’s condemnation by the Inquisition had a profound impact on Descartes and made him abandon the publication 72
of Le Monde and considering not to publish anything anymore, unless the Church would approve of it: see AT I p. 
270-272 (Descartes to Mersenne, November 1633) and p. 285-289 (Descartes to Mersenne, April 1634).
 AT VII p. 40-41.73
 AT VII p. 41.74
 Descartes discusses the same topic in article 27 of the Principia (AT VIII p. 11), though in a more concise manner. 75
Significantly, in the by Descartes authorized French translation all Scholastic terminology has been omitted (AT IX p. 32).
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methodical principle for reading Descartes and so has to dismiss this part of the third meditation as 
unintelligible: that is Williams’ shortcoming, not Descartes’.76
So representation is the way in which thought is naturally connected to natural phenomena 
and both the senses and reason contribute to it through the image-forming force. In order to get the 
right representation of natural phenomena man needs to cultivate his naturally inborn constitution 
and make the divine seeds of knowledge grow and yield fruits through the right use of reason.
§ 5 The method as language reform.
Descartes bears witness to the experience that the world has outgrown man, revealing the infinite 
micro and macrocosmos. There is no resemblance anymore between man and the world he lives 
in. Man is not at home anymore in this world, which is an uncanny experience.  In a very literal 77
sense man cannot believe his eyes anymore, as they do not convey the truth about things 
anymore, at least not completely. Descartes’ answer to this challenge is the method.  The method 78
is the right use,  which is a regulated use,  of our reason  which is equally naturally inborn to all 79 80 81
humans  to augment and complement our naturally inborn senses, so man can grow up, in pursuit 82
of the world that has outgrown him. Reason is the ability to judge in the right way and so 
distinguish the truth from falsehoods.83
The first article of the Principia voices it in this way:
Quoniam infantes nati sumus, & varia de rebus sensibilibus judicia prius tulimus, 
quam integrum nostrae rationis usum haberemus, multis praejudiciis a veri 
cognitione avertimur; quibus non aliter videmur posse liberari, quam si semel in vita 
de iis omnibus studeamus dubitare, in quibus vel minimam incertitudinis 
suspicionem reperiemus.84
Man is an infant which needs to grow up, i.e. acquire the full use of his reason, so he can 
acquire true knowledge. In order to get started man needs to deliver himself of all the childish 
prejudices he has about the world which keep him from knowing the truth and this deliverance is 
brought about by doubting everything once in your life. That accomplished, man can start to grow 
up and learn how to talk, not being an infant anymore. The method points the way how to learn to 
 In my opinion this is an illustration of the general mistake much secondary literature of Descartes (for example 76
Williams 2005, Schmalz 2008 and certain contributions in Gaukroger 1980 and Cottingham 1992 and much of the French 
literature on Descartes) employs: stressing a continuity rather than the abyssal caesura between Descartes and 
Mediaeval Scholasticism. How historically correct a continuity may be, the caesura should, in my opinion, be the 
philosophical methodical principle guiding the interpretation of Descartes, because Descartes’ thought is driven by his 
fundamental experience which is completely different from Aristotle’s carrying Scholasticism. I will not elaborate on this 
not only for reasons of restrictions in size, but also because the aim of this thesis is not to be a contribution to Descartes-
scholarship, but a preparation for the philosophical question what a human being is.
 That it is an uncanny experience indeed for Descartes will be discussed in § 6.77
 AT X p. 371, rule four: “Necessaria est Methodus ad rerum veritatem investigandam.”78
 Full title of the Discours de la Méthode pour bien conduire sa raison et chercher la vérité dans les sciences.79
 Full title of the Regulae ad directionem ingenii.80
 AT VI p. 2: “Car ce n’ est pas assez d’ avoir l’ esprit bon, mais le principal est de l’ appliquer bien”.81
 AT VI p. 1-2: “Le bon sens est la chose du monde la mieux partagée (…) le bon sens ou la raison, est naturellement 82
égale en tous les hommes.”
 AT VI p. 2: “la puissance de bien juger, et distinguer le vrai d’ avec le faux, qui est proprement ce qu’ on nomme le bon 83
sens ou la raison.”
 AT VIII p. 5.84
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talk about the world and order thought in this way in representing the world in the right order in 
order to know the truth to deliver oneself of the bonds of nature.85
In the Discours Descartes makes it clear that the method is a reform of language in two 
interconnected ways. First, he wants to get rid of the language of Scholastic philosophy. The 
language of Scholasticism is the language of the study of letters and as such unfit for the study of 
the book of the world (le grand livre du monde),  because there is no testing in the real world 86
involved. It is the language of arm-chair scholars. The language of the study of letters does not 
matter when it comes to real life questions.  Second, he wants to get rid of it by implementing a 87
new way of talking about nature in which one thing is known through another in an order of 
knowledge which is a mathematical progression which can be algebraically expressed as the 
quantitative relations between quantities, instead of qualitative relations between essences stitched 
together in non-sensical syllogisms, as has been explained above. Briefly, he wants to algebraise 
language.
But how is the algebraic language to be implemented? It is significant that Descartes still 
needs natural colloquial language rather than formal mathematical language, i.e. stories in French 
rather than rigorous algebraic analysis and proof, to exhibit his point. Apparently, colloquial 
language has a natural rhetorical force of its own to convey the truth and to persuade people to 
adopt the new philosophy and concomitantly algebraically transform their language. The new 
language and new way of thinking do not start from scratch: nature had already bestowed on 
humans their mother tongues and the use of their inborn senses and reason, which, however, need 
to be cultivated, i.e. algebraically transformed.
Initially, Descartes seems to be reserved at the prospect of transforming language and 
reforming thought. He discusses the proposal for a universal language in a letter to Mersenne in 
1629, deeming it possible to invent one on the one hand, but not expecting to see its usage on the 
other, because it presupposes such a great change in the order of things, that it would be 
necessary that the world would become a terrestrial paradise, which would only be a good 
suggestion in fairy land.  But in his Discours of 1637 he thinks that the method will render us the 88
masters and possessors of nature which will turn our earth into a terrestrial paradise.  Between 89
1629 and 1637 he seems to have found a way along which to actually transform thought and 
language, which is the method as algebraisation.
Descartes very early on conceived of the method as an answer to the existential challenge 
and uncanny experience of the emergence of the new world as the infinite cosmos. Rule four 
represents very early material in Descartes’ thinking, probably originating around the same time as 
he had his famous dreams in november 1619.  But his conception of what the method exactly is 90
developed over the years, originating with the Regulae (probably written in an intermittent and 
 This is the programme of the Enlightenment which has profoundly shaped our conception of our own identity. 85
Compare Kant who writes approximately 150 years after Descartes in his Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? 
in the same vein as Descartes: “Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten 
Unmündigkeit. Unmündigkeit ist das Unvermögen, sich seines Verstandes ohne Leitung eines anderen zu bedienen. 
Selbstverschuldet ist diese Unmündigkeit, wenn die Ursache derselben nicht am Mangel des Verstandes, sondern der 
Entschliessung und des Mutes liegt, sich seiner ohne Leitung eines andern zu bedienen. Sapere aude! Habe mut, dich 
deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen! ist also der Wahlspruch der Aufklärung.” (Aufklärung p. 20.)
 AT VI p. 9.86
 AT VI p. 9-10: “Car il me semblait que je pourrais rencontrer beaucoup plus de vérité, dans les raisonnements que 87
chacun fait touchant les affaires qui lui importent, et dont l’ évenement le doit punit bientôt après, s’ il a mal jugé, que 
dans ceux que fait un homme de lettres dans son cabinet, touchant des spéculations qui ne produisent aucun effet (…).” 
Which is also the reason why he writes in French rather than Latin in the Discours: literally ridding himself here of the 
language of his teachers to make natural reason come out more purely and his new philosophy easier understood: AT VI 
p. 77-78. 
 AT I p. 80-82: Descartes to Mersenne, 20 November 1629.88
 AT VI p. 61-62.89
 Gaukroger 1980: chapter 3 by John Schuster.90
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discontinuous fashion between 1619 and 1628)  and culminating in the Discours and its Essais 91
(1637).
Already in the Regulae it is clear that true knowledge must be exposed as an enumerable 
mathematical progression instead of references to the essence of things like Scholastic 
philosophers did,  but the way in which Descartes conceives of the exposition of the progression 92
in the Regulae is still geometrical, i.e. figurative in terms of line lengths and geometrical figures,  93
and it breaks down when mathematical problems become more and more complex; significantly, it 
is the point where the Regulae break off.  Initially, Descartes wants there to be a one-on-one 94
correspondence between geometrical figures and algebraic expressions to found the clarity of the 
latter on the clarity of the former, but here Descartes realises that if the clarity and distinctness of 
which mathematics is the medium is restricted to literal images, i.e. geometrical figures, 
mathematics will be very restricted in representing nature and exposing knowledge. The clarity of 
mathematics has nothing to do with sensual images: the clarity of sensuality is its rationality, i.e. 
the fact that I conceive something to be what it is and perceive that to be clear and distinct, as he 
later explains in the Meditationes.  Perception and conception as driven by the image-forming 95
force have nothing to do with images conveyed through the senses, but are, as formalisation, a 
way of thinking, which is, however, at the same time a way of feeling (as perceiving something to 
be clear and distinct). Again, the point here is the empirical nature of truth as the illumination of the 
inborn constitution by the natural light.  The senses are already pervaded by rationality. The 96
perceiving mind already dwells in the sensing of the senses, conceiving of something as 
something.  In the as of the conception dwells the formalising force, the as being the 97
representation.98
Nature is conceived of by Descartes in a mathematical way, but this implies abstract, non-
figurative algebra also representing nature and being even better at it than geometry. The 
mathematical conception of nature is nothing geometrical, i.e. sensual, but something algebraic, 
i.e. mechanical. In tracing this development of Descartes’ thinking about mathematics, nature and 
method and his gradually leaving resemblance behind in ever ascending steps of abstraction one 
can see the reform of thought at work in Descartes’ thought itself. Descartes’ thought embodies its 
own restructuring in its transformation in the same algebraic-mechanical nature of the nature it is 
trying to capture in its conceptions.
Descartes’ letter to Mersenne of 20 November 1629 signals that Descartes knows that in 
order to reform thought and language to obtain true knowledge the clarity and distinctness of 
counting and calculating, i.e. how numbers, their enumerability and arithmetic c.q. algebraic 
 Ibid.91
 AT X p. 359 (rule one), AT X p. 362 (rule two), AT p. 366 (rule three), AT X p. 381(rule six and its exposition): “monet 92
enim res omnes per quasdam series posse disponi, non quidem in quantum ad aliquod genus entis referuntur, sicut illas 
Philosophi in categorias suas diviserunt, sed in quantum unae ex aliis cognosci possunt.”  And AT X p. 387 (rule seven), 
which is mirrored by the fourth rule in the Discours (AT VI p. 19 and Gilson p. 488). Note Descartes’ explicit use of the 
word ‘enumeratio’ in Latin and ‘dénombrements’ in French.
 AT X p. 461-468 (rule 18 and its exposition).93
 AT X p. 468-469 (rules 19-21 dealing with higher-order root extractions) and Gaukroger 1995 p. 172-181.94
 AT VII p. 30-31: explaining the true nature of extended things with the example of the wax: “Superest igitur ut 95
concedam, me nequidem imaginari quid sit haec cera, sed sola mente percipere (…) Atqui, quod notandum est, ejus 
perceptio non visio, non tactio, non imaginatio est (…), sed solius mentis inspectio.” [my italics] The extendedness of 
things which is conceived by the mind and perceived by it as being clear and distinct is illuminated by the natural light.
 See § 2.96
 In this way rationality and sensuality are thoroughly intertwined and driven by the same formalising force, which is 97
reflected by Descartes’ remark that the rational soul is not lodged in the body like a pilot in his ship, but that they are 
joined and unified in an intimate way in order to experience sentiments (AT VI p. 59).
 See § 4.98
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operations convey the natural light, has to be transferred to language. He deems it possible to 
invent a universal language which would be very easy to learn if the primitive words and their 
symbols could be composed in the same order as the natural one between numbers and their 
infinite enumerability, so all other words necessary to express the things which occur in the mind 
could be written down in the same way as one counts. The invention of such a language would 
depend on the true philosophy putting thoughts in order and enumerating them and sorting out the 
clear and simple ones of which all thoughts are constituted, which is the great secret for acquiring 
true knowledge. The universal language will distinctly represent all things, making it almost 
impossible to mistake oneself and so aiding one’s judgment. As it is, however, the words in the 
natural languages have confused meanings and the human mind is so accustomed to them that 
there is virtually nothing which one can understand perfectly. It will take a huge change in the order 
of things to transform language into a universal one, nothing less than the earth becoming a 
terrestrial paradise.99
So Descartes has to find a way to transform the order of things which will concomitantly 
transform the order of thoughts. He has found it exactly here: in the algebraisation of thought, 
treating thoughts in the same way as numbers, treating them as enumerable, generated from 
primitive ones, and combining them in the same way as numbers are combined in arithmetic 
operations. Thinking is counting and as such thoughts are enumerable. The order of knowledge is 
enumerable like the natural numbers.100
Descartes is not inventing the algebraisation of thought from nothing: he follows the natural 
order of numbers which cannot be but a representation of the natural order of things: the seeds of 
the right order are already out there as the seeds of true knowledge are already within us, which is 
one and the same thing as an institution of nature. The right order can implement itself in the world 
through the mind exercising the method which is the application of mathematics to nature and 
mechanically transforming it through technology and vice versa: a positive feed-back system 
between mind and nature, being in the same boat, but neither of them being the pilot. This is the 
cultivation of our inborn constitution which is as much a cultivation of the world.
 AT I p. 80-82. Descartes’ considerations in this letter to Mersenne are in effect the germ for Leibniz’ idea of the 99
enumerability of all human thoughts in an Encyclopaedia to be expressed in a Characteristica universalis as the universal 
language to aid the judgment by means of a Calculus ratiocinator: compare note 45. This in its turn contains all the 
ingredients of all the problems in the foundations of mathematics sparking the tradition of analytic philosophy from Frege 
and Russell to Wittgenstein and triggering the work in formal logic and the foundations of mathematics by Hilbert, Gödel 
and Turing. These problems concern the completeness and decidability of formal calculi like mathematics. This ultimately 
concerns “the extent and the limitations of mechanistic explanations” (Max Newman writing about Turing’s work, quoted 
in Copeland 2004 p. 3) and as such the extent and limitations of the human scientific conception and technological 
control of nature. The central concept here is enumerability and the (im)possibility to count and order everything 
according to the set of natural numbers, ultimately pairing off all complex higher order structures to natural numbers and 
so being able to enumerate and order everything, which is what Descartes is suggesting to Mersenne. Descartes 
implicitly suggests that the algebraic representation of nature is complete and by means of the criterion of primitive 
notions constituting all representations being clear and distinct decidable. Descartes suggests the cosmos to be a clock-
work universe, which was taken to its ultimate consequences by Laplace (Essai philosophique sur les probabilités 
(1795)), and his method to be a proto-Hilbert programme for nature. This was to be proved impossible by resp. Cantor’s 
proof of diagonalisation in 1891 demonstrating the set of real numbers to be non-enumerable, Gödel’s proof of 
incompleteness of contradiction-free formal systems in 1932 and Turing’s proof of undecidability in 1936. This formal 
work is mirrored by the empirical work of Darwin (evolution by natural selection), Boltzmann (thermodynamics) and 
Planck, Bohr, de Broglie, Pauli c.s. (quantum mechanics) destroying the clock-work universe. Due to restrictions in size it 
is not possible to pursue this in detail in this thesis, but it is important to realise that though these formal and empirical 
developments have taken place we still act like we can completely understand and control nature, as argued in the 
introduction. Somehow we cannot feel the consequences of these developments and turn a blind eye to our own 
transformed identity and place in the cosmos. Or rather: there seems to be a lag between these events and our 
reception, perception and conception of them. Nietzsche points to this lag when speaking of us as being shone upon by 
the light of stars that have died a long time ago, but whose light is still on its way to us: KSA 3 p. 303 and p. 481-482, 
KSA 4 p. 121 and KSA 5 p. 232. See also § 7.
 AT VI p. 18-19 (the four rules) and 21: “Car enfin la méthode qui enseigne à suivre le vrai ordre, et à dénombrer 100
exactement toutes les circonstances de ce qu’ on cherche, contient tout ce qui donne de la certitude aux règles d’ 
arithmetique.”
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In the next years Descartes will develop his method, cultivate the seeds and expose his 
new science and philosophy in the works he publishes as the fruits to reap.  The considerations 101
of Descartes in the letter to Mersenne of 20 November 1629 are the link between the Regulae and 
the Discours and its Essais which constitute the core of Descartes’ thought.
The method is an answer to something that vexes Descartes, but to what exactly? Why 
should there be a cultivation of nature anyway? What is the origin of the method?
§ 6 The origin of the method.
Descartes’ criticism of Aristotelian Scholastic philosophy consists in it being an unnatural way of 
thinking and as such being sterile. If this is the case: why did it take philosophers so much time to 
figure this out? There are almost two millennia between Aristotle’s death and Descartes’ birth. And 
why did Aristotle come up with such an unnatural way of thinking in the first place? Or has 
something changed in the way human beings are in the world, changing their relationship with 
nature and their identity and place in the cosmos? And is this change driving Descartes’ thought?
To be precise, Descartes thinks the Scholastic philosophers employ unnatural methods of 
thought and losing themselves in endless disputes, based on Aristotelian philosophy. Aristotelian 
philosophy itself is not so much unnatural as it is naive, childish. Aristotle is more like an infant, 
someone who does not quite have the entire use of reason (usus integrus nostrae rationis) and 
averted from true knowledge by prejudices (avertitur a veri cognitione multiis praejudiciis) 
generated by the senses (varia judicia de rebus sensibilius). Man has to grow up and use his 
reason to augment and complement the senses, because he has discovered that the world is 
much bigger than he thought it was, infinitely bigger, to be precise, but fortunately  this infinity 102
seems to be enumerable and as such the vast cosmos can be represented according to order and 
measure. Nature as the enumerable infinity becomes the domain of causal relations between inert 
particles represented by a mechanical algebra. This enables man to mechanically interfere with the 
course of nature and so domesticate and cultivate it for his own good.
Is it possible to trace Descartes’ experience of the infinite cosmos and to trace his own 
child-like fear for a world he discovers to be infinitely bigger than he thought it was? Descartes’ 
thought emerged after an existential crisis and is driven by an uncanny experience of nature.
There are several instances in his work where Descartes mentions doubting everything 
once in your life (semel in vita; une fois en sa vie) in order to deliver oneself of the prejudices which 
keep one from knowing the truth.  The doubt is formalised in the first meditation in the guise of a 103
malignant spirit (genius malignus)  in order to find the Archimedean Point of truth.  Both the 104 105
malignant genius and the Archimedean Point are of note here.
In both the Discours and the Regulae Descartes explains how his predisposition for 
mathematics set him on the right path pointing the way to truth, but how did he come to associate 
mathematics with truth? Why does the natural light illuminate him through the medium of 
mathematics?
There was a time when mathematical physics was just a game for Descartes. His mentor 
Beeckman scolds him for not being serious about it,  though they are virtually the only ones 106
 AT VI p. 3: “Car j’ en ai déjà recueilli de tels fruits (…).”101
 This good fortune will be discussed below.102
 AT III p. 695; AT VII p. 17; AT VIII p. 5; AT X p. 392-400.103
 AT VII p. 22.104
 AT VII p. 24.105
 AT X p. 167-169: Beeckman to Descartes, 6 May 1619, and Cole 1992 chapter 6.106
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understanding this physico-mathematics and exploring its possibilities.  Instead of writing the 107
treatise about mechanics which Descartes had promised to Beeckman  he sets out to travel 108
through Europe and wander about.109
During his wanderings through Europe Descartes settles down somewhere in Germany in 
November 1619 and here the true significance of his and Beeckman’s physico-mathematics hit 
him. Thanks to Baillet’s account of it we can reconstruct what happened.  Baillet quotes 110
Descartes:
XI. Novembris 1620, coepi intelligere fundamentum Inventi mirabilis,
And:
X. Novembris 1619, cum plenus forem Enthousiasmo, & mirabilis scientiae 
fundamenta reperirem &c.111
Descartes claims to have been enthousiast, philosophically manic, possessed  and to 112
have found the foundations of the wonderful science. He finds it after literally removing all the 
prejudices and doubting everything he seems to know. It was like his imagination presented his 
mind as completely nude. Nothing remained but the love of truth, the pursuit of which would be the 
occupation of his life. Fatigued by his philosophical exercises Descartes’ brain seemed to catch fire 
and he became enthousiast, which disposed his mind to receive dreams and visions. After falling 
asleep in this condition he receives three dreams which, according to himself, could not have come 
to him but from above (d’ enhaut).113
I will not try to interpret Descartes’ dreams, for I am no psychologist,  but I would like to 114
point out the similarities between certain themes and phrases Descartes c.q. Baillet uses in the 
description of the dreams and the situation surrounding them on the one hand and their recurrence 
in his later work on the other in order to suggest that Descartes’ thought is driven by an uncanny 
experience and existential challenge.
In his first dream Descartes is blown off his feet by a violent wind which makes him spin. He 
cannot stand on his feet and walk properly and is about to fall down with every step he takes, 
which makes him feel embarrassed. When he tries to reach a church for shelter he passes an 
acquaintance without saluting him and wanting to turn back and greet him he is violently pushed 
 AT X p. 52 (which corresponds to Journal tenu par Isaac Beeckman de 1604-1634. Tome I: 1604-1619 [Beeckman’s 107
Tafelboeckje] p. 244): “Physico-mathematici paucissimi”.
 AT X p. 162: Descartes to Beeckman, 23 April 1619.108
 AT X p. 165: Descartes to Beeckman, 29 April 1619.109
 I will not discuss the question of the authenticity of Baillet’s account, Descartes’ original notebook being lost, which 110
has been discussed in depth by John Cole in Cole 1992, making a very convincing case that Baillet’s account is 
authentic and trustworthy. The core of the argument is that Baillet’s shortcomings as an historian are our luck, because 
he seems to have literally and uncritically translated Descartes’ original Latin text into French. Some parts of it have been 
copied by Leibniz and can be compared to Baillet’s account and some key phrases of Descartes are quoted by Baillet in 
Latin.
 AT X p. 179.111
 Compare Plato Phaedrus 244a-249d (manía and enthousiázoon).112
 AT X p. 180-181.113
 Their content seems to be relevant in connection to his relationship with his father, which was problematic, and 114
Beeckman, who was a father figure to him, and how that shaped his life and career as a philosopher and scientist: see 
Cole 1992.
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against the church by the wind.  Descartes himself interprets the wind as being an evil spirit who 115
forces him to go somewhere where Descartes intended to go voluntarily.116
To describe the way in which the wind makes him spin on his feet Baillet uses the French 
expression tourbillon. Exactly the same expression, but in Latin: turbatus, is used by Descartes in 
the second meditation to describe the effect of the first meditation: throwing him in doubt, being 
spun around and not being able to find a place for his feet to stand properly,  which reminds us 117
also of the dream. Just like in the dream Descartes attributes this all to a malignant spirit. In the 
description of the dream Baillet uses the French mauvais genie, but also quotes Descartes’ original 
Latin: Spiritus malus. Just like in the dream Descartes tries to find a place for his feet to stand 
properly, which is the Archimedean Point mentioned in the second meditation, and walk with 
assurance through his life, as he mentions in the Discours,  because he feels embarrassed by 118
insecurity.  Finally, the dream came to Descartes in a heated chamber in Germany, like the 119
Meditationes are situated in a heated chamber where he doubts everything and sees the wax 
transformed by the heat of the fire. This parallel situation is no coincidence, for he alludes to it 
himself in the Discours.120
After waking up from the first dream Descartes prays to God and considers his sins which 
he thought were serious enough to draw the lightning from the skies onto his head. He falls asleep 
again and gets his second dream in which he is suddenly awakened by a thunder clap and 
opening his eyes he sees a lot of sparks of fire about in his chamber.  This reminds us of the 121
divine seeds of knowledge educed from our inborn constitution by reason like the sparks from a 
flint.  Descartes interprets the thunder clap as the signal of the Spirit of Truth descending upon 122
and possessing him.123
These first two dreams are accompanied with fear, but the fear disappears with the third 
dream which has Descartes’ course of life as explicit theme as it features a quotation from 
Ausonius: “Quod vitae sectabor iter?” Also, both the original poem itself as well as Descartes’ 
dream allude to Pythagoras’ nai kai ou.  The course Descartes’ life will take is at stake: no more 124
wandering about, but taking the right way of truth and certainty.
Descartes’ course of life has to become regular and methodical in order to acquire true 
knowledge. The true significance of the physico-mathematics that hit him is its fundament in 
absolute certainty as the Archimedean Point from which to move the earth  and that due to this 125
certainty mathematics can be used to regulate life in a methodical way, so life can be productive 
and yield fruits. The natural light shines through the certainty and regularity of a certain way of 
thinking, i.e. the counting and calculating one. The natural light shines through numbers and 
 AT X p. 181.115
 AT X p. 185-186.116
 AT VII p. 23-24.117
 AT VI p. 10.118
 AT VI p. 4.119
 AT VI p. 11.120
 AT X p. 182.121
 AT X p. 184 and p. 217. Also compare AT VI p. 64 (“certaines semences de vérités qui sont naturellement en nos 122
âmes”), AT X p. 373 (“Habet enim humana mens nescio quid divini, in quo prima cogitationum semina ita jacta sunt”) and 
p. 376 (“prima quaedam veritatum semina humanis ingeniis a natura insita”).
 AT X p. 186.123
 AT X p. 182-185.124
 According to Pappus Archimedes once said: “Dos moi poo stoo kai kinoo tèn gèn” when talking about levers (Pappi 125
Alexandrini Collectionis VIII p. 1060).
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arithmetic operations and so they can be used to regulate life: this is what hits Descartes and 
provides the firm place and the lever to lift the world from its hinges.
The inconstancy and irregularity of wild nature is what vexes Descartes and inspires his 
fear of it, expressed as the Spiritus malus. He has experienced this himself in the inconstancy of 
his adolescent life, not knowing what to do, his wandering about and the physico-mathematics of 
him and Beeckman demonstrating the untrustworthiness of thinking that our ideas resemble the 
world. The world is not like what our natural aptitude, as constituted by our bodily senses and our 
inborn natural use of reason, makes it seem. Traditional Scholastic philosophy has no answer to it, 
for it is unnatural and unproductive in its methods and based on infantile Aristotelian thought. 
Infantile Aristotelian thought has no answer to the experience that our natural aptitude to be in and 
deal with the world does not completely convey the truth about things. He is vexed by the fact that 
nature contains the divine seeds of knowledge, but they only yield fruits spontaneously, not 
regularly, and that Scholasticism is more of a hindrance than of assistance.  Nature and our 126
naturally inborn constitution need cultivation in order to yield fruits regularly.  In order to 127
accomplish this man must stop wandering about, start finding the truth in a methodical way  and 128
make progress and set his hope on the future.  This cultivation is accomplished through the 129
method showing the right way (le droit chemin; rectum veritatis iter).130
Briefly, things are not what they seem to be. Significations and identities differ and express 
natural variation. The unity of what is is divided in what it naturally seems to be and what it 
rationally can be. This is what Descartes experiences. This divided unity and divergent identity 
should be regulated: the method promises to accomplish just this.
Descartes fortunately  found the method due to his natural aptitude  and the diverging 131 132
ways on which he found himself in his life.  It was a good fortune for him to find the method in 133
which his natural talents blended with his walk of life.  The origin of the method as a good fortune 134
and spontaneous fruit of nature is, however, not exactly regulated and methodical itself.
Descartes’ method as the cultivation of nature is the cultivation of just one aspect of nature: 
its enumerability and computability enabling the articulation of it according to order and measure 
enabling the mechanical intervention in it. The irregular, spontaneous and non-enumerable aspect 
is conspicuously left out, though it is exactly this aspect of nature which enabled the emergence of 
the method. Descartes’ cultivation is the domestication of nature and as such a philosophical 
Neolithic Revolution, cultivating the earth and weeding out unwanted natural growth, ultimately 
resulting in the Scientific, Industrial and Information Revolution, the consequences of which we can 
 AT VI p. 7 (“dons de l’ esprit” versus “fruits de l’ étude”); AT X p. 373: the divine seeds of knowledge can produce 126
spontaneous fruits, as long as they are not neglected and suffocated by the wrong studies.
 AT X p. 371-378: rule four and its exposition: note the organic terminology Descartes uses (ingenium, ingenitus, 127
nasci, natura, fructus, semen, excolere, cura, maturitas) as opposed to the mathematical-mechanistic terminology used 
throughout the rest of the Regulae; compare the organic terminology of Descartes’ introduction to the French translation 
of the Principia representing philosophy and science as developed by the method as a tree with metaphysics being the 
roots, physics the trunk and medicine, morals and mechanics the branches from which the fruits are plucked (AT IX p. 
14-15): Descartes does not mention the soil in which the tree is rooted, which is the ingenium as the institution of nature 
in which the divine seeds of knowledge have been sown). This difference in terminology is relevant: see conclusion.
 AT X p. 371.128
 AT VI p. 3; AT VII p. 80.129
 AT VI p. 2; AT X p. 366.130
 AT VI p. 3 (beaucoup d’ heur).131
 AT X p. 403-404. 132
 AT VI p. 3 (certains chemins).133
 Gilson 1987 p. 92: “On notera surtout dans ces textes [Discours and Regulae] le caractère spontané de la méthode 134
cartésienne, dont les règles ne feront que codifier les démarches d’une raison exceptionellement heureuse.”
 22
hardly fathom. With Descartes the true significance of the Neolithic Revolution, which took place 
after the last Ice Age, is perceived with a time lag of 10.000 years.  The true significance of the 135
Neolithic Revolution is the idea of man becoming the master and possessor of nature, but nature 
itself has already set the stage for the emergence of this idea in a way which is incalculable by 
man and only perceived after a significant time lag, if it is perceived at all.
The evolution and nature of our species, H. sapiens, and its way of life have thoroughly 
been shaped by the occurrence of the Ice Ages.  No philosophy, science and technology without 136
the Neolithic Revolution, no Neolithic Revolution without the Ice Ages and no Ice Ages without 
certain cosmic constellations and cycles. The occurrence of the Ice Ages is determined by certain 
cosmic cycles in deep time.  This is the infinitely greater cosmos that Descartes experiences: 137
deep space, the cosmos and its cycles determining our nature and our way of life.
Apparently, we are not able to immediately perceive and completely survey the 
consequences of these cosmic cycles determining our nature and way of life, though we can 
compute the cycles themselves, giving us some idea of our cosmic situation. On the one hand 
nature may be computable, but on the other it is determining us and generating infinitely many 
consequences and spontaneous new significances in an incalculable way. These two aspects of 
nature cannot be brought together by the essentially discursive nature of the human mind.  The 138
significance of things may be perceived by us, but always lagging behind their natural causes. 
Things take time. The world as a semantic whole in which Descartes experiences himself to be a 
part will always be innumerably many steps ahead of man.  139
Ultimately, Descartes’ method and our science and technology sprouting from it are borne 
by the cosmos in a way we cannot possibly survey. Man becoming the master and possessor of 
nature is a mirage. Rather, in chasing this mirage man is the plaything of some of nature’s 
outgrowths: counting and calculating thought and a semantics of command and control, 
propagating themselves through human evolution. Keeping this in mind: what is man’s place in the 
world according to Descartes? What is, according to Descartes, a human being?
 Compare note 99: Nietzsche and time lag. The first people making the transition from hunting-gathering to farming 135
felt the cosmic cycle and its consequences to which the earth is subject (see note 137) to which this evolutionary 
adaptation bears witness, but not until Descartes the significance of this cosmic cycle sparking this evolutionary event 
becomes clear. Descartes’ method in its turn sparked the development of mathematical physics which is able to 
articulate and compute the cosmic cycle itself, enabling us a view on our cosmic situation.
 Wilson, Drury and Chapman 2000 (part 2).136
 The Milankovich Pacemaker.137
 Descartes would say that only God can survey everything completely at one glance.138
 This is perceived shortly after Descartes by Rousseau, answering to Descartes’ perception of the Neolithic 139
Revolution in the method in his Essai sur l’ origine des langues pointing out the cosmic perspective being greater than 
man can survey: “Celui qui voulut que l’ homme fut sociable toucha du doigt l’ axe du globe et l’ inclina sur l’ axe de l’ 
univers. À ce léger mouvement je vois changer la face de la terre et décider la vocation du genre humain: j’ entens au 
loins les cris de joye d’ une multitude insensée; je vois naitre les arts, les loix, le commerce; je vois les peuples se former, 
s’ étendre, se dissoudre, se succéder comme les flots de la mer: je vois les hommes rassemblés sur quelques points de 
leur demeure pour s’ y dévorer mutuellement, faire un affreux desert du reste du monde; digne monument de l‘ union 
sociale et de l’ utilité des arts.” (OC V p. 401.) In the same text, especially in chapter V: De l’ écriture, Rousseau 
acknowledges the evolving algebraic character of language, but as opposed to Descartes who conceives of the 
algebraisation as cultivation, though of seeds sown by nature in the human constitution, and has a time horizon 
stretching to the Ancient Greeks (in the Regulae Descartes locates the seeds and their first spontaneous fruits in Ancient 
Greek mathematics), Rousseau conceives of the algebraisation as part of a natural progression in a far longer time span, 
stretching beyond Herodotus, Homerus and the Bible book of Genesis to the Neolithic Revolution itself (OC V p. 
385-388). Rousseau is the first to suspect something that Descartes did not: deep time in which natural progressions 
take place. For reasons of restrictions in size this connection between Descartes and Rousseau will not be explored in 
this thesis.
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§ 7 Human nature.
In the Discours Descartes conceives of the human mind as a universal instrument and as such a 
universal computer, not depending on particular corporeal dispositions.  Human use and 140
understanding of language bear witness to this, as Descartes infers from his comparison between 
machines and creatures endowed with reason.  Implicitly in the Discours, the extent of the 141
human mind is limited to computability and so to mechanistic explanations. Descartes is more 
explicit about it elsewhere: man should only seek efficient causal explanations, no final causal 
ones, for neither is he a party to God’s council and decisions nor has insight in divine Providence 
been granted to him.  So it is exactly the computing-mechanistic way of thinking that should be 142
cultivated in order to know the truth. Does this way of thinking help Descartes in conceiving of the 
human being?
The very fact that the mind as a universal instrument does not depend on particular 
corporeal dispositions demonstrates its non-corporeal and non-mechanical nature.  So it is 143
obvious that mathematical physics is not apt to describe and explain the nature of the mind. In 
danger of stating the obvious: it is important to realise that the confinement of the human mind to 
computing and mechanistic explanations concerns its dealing with nature in its aspect of being 
inert and corpuscular and subject to efficient causality. Now that Descartes has demonstrated the 
non-mechanical nature of the mind he obviously needs another method of dealing with the soul 
than algebraic mathematics. This is where metaphysics steps in.
It is no coincidence that Descartes finds the metaphysical foothold in language like he finds 
a way to articulate his criticism of Aristotelianism in the analogy of language at the beginning of Le 
Monde as quoted. Understanding the meaning of words does not involve resemblance: the cause 
of the idea does not resemble the resulting idea in the mind. The meaning of words, including 
formal mathematical language, is not causally conveyed to the mind, but by means of 
representation, as we have seen. Representation, as we have seen, involves formalisation by the 
image-forming force. So the image-forming force is something different from the mechanical force 
involved in efficient causality.
But what is metaphysics? Obviously, it should be something different from mathematics, 
but, like mathematics, it should convey the natural light illuminating the human mind through clear 
and distinct concepts in order to state the truth. Nowhere in his work Descartes gives a clear 
definition of metaphysics, but rather defines it by its subject-matter: the demonstration of God’s 
existence and the soul’s being distinct from the body.  In the Meditationes this demonstration is 144
accomplished by examining the basic concepts by methodical doubt and testing them according to 
their certainty. The sticking point for Descartes (haereo tamen) is the way in which he thinks, 
whether the thoughts are true or not: there is thinking going on and since I am doing the thinking, 
even when an evil spirit is deceiving me, I also must be something.  This is Descartes’ 145
Archimedean Point.
Descartes demonstrates this way of thinking to be judging:  every thought about 146
something, true or not, has the structure of judgment (A is B) and ultimately every judgment 
 AT VI p. 56-60; see § 3.140
 Which actually is the proto-Turing Test. Compare Turing’s Computing machinery and intelligence (1950), though 141
Descartes infers the exact opposite conclusion of Turing’s. Again, the connection between Descartes and Turing can 
hardly be overemphasized. Descartes uses his proto-Turing Test in a variant form in the Meditationes: AT VII p. 32.
 AT VII p. 55; AT VIII p. 15.142
 AT VI p. 56-60; “elle [l’âme raisonnable] ne peut aucunement être tirée de la puissance de la matière” (p. 59).143
 Full title of the Meditationes de Prima Philosophia in quibus Dei existentia & animae a corpore distinctio 144
demonstrantur.
 AT VII p. 24-25.145
 AT VII p. 32.146
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implicitly contains the first one of me thinking and therefore being something (I think, that A is B). 
But this is not the end of the story: judgments come with feelings, perceptions.147
In exploring the nature of the ego after establishing it as his Archimedean Point Descartes 
still cannot separate it distinctly from corporeal things according to the order of knowing and 
decides to give his mind a free reign in order to tighten it to the limits of truth better afterwards.  148
He considers a corporeal thing, a piece of wax, like we commonly consider corporeal things: as if 
we distinctly understand it as we touch and see it. Initially, it seems that what the senses convey 
about it contains everything to understand it distinctly: its smell which still retains the scent of 
flowers, its taste which still retains the taste of honey, its colour and shape as taken from the 
honeycomb. But it is easily transformed by the heat of the fire, eliminating the scent of flowers and 
taste of honey, changing the colour, making it liquid. Still, the same wax remains, so maybe its 
identity consists in it being a body which appeared to me in a certain shape a little while ago and 
which now exhibits another. But then again: the changeability of the wax is not conveyed by my 
imagination of the shapes of wax, because it can take on innumerable shapes and I cannot run 
through all of them. So what the wax truly is is not conveyed by the senses or imagination, but only 
perceived by the mind (sed sola mente percipere). The perception has nothing to do with vision, 
touch or imagination, but only with an inspection of the mind (sed solius mentis inspectio), which 
can be confused or clear and distinct, depending on how much attention is paid to it.149
This inspection of the mind is neither something mystical nor a scrutiny of the mind as 
some kind of vessel containing perceptions. The inspection is an insight by the mind in what the 
wax is as an extended thing with attributes. This insight reveals itself to be a perception, no 
sensation or imagination, by which Descartes means it to be something semantic, not mechanical, 
i.e. a representation. Descartes perceives that what the wax is is nothing resembling that what 
causes his sensation of it conveyed by the sense organs or his imagination. The wax is what the 
mind feels it to be. This feeling has nothing to do with emotions or tenderness, but with the basic 
experience of the world as voiced by Descartes at the start of Le Monde.  This is not something 150
arbitrary, something made up by Descartes, but a reflection of the way in which the human mind is 
attuned to the world, i.e. a reflection of the institution of nature. This is demonstrated by the 
exposition of the wax, because Descartes erases the original world from which the wax is taken: 
the familiar and intimately nearby world of flowers and beehives, i.e. the familiar everyday world of 
the senses. Instead of this world he reveals the world of the algebraic mind behind it surveying the 
micro and macrocosmos. The infantile world of the senses submerges and the cosmic world of 
microscopic particles to telescopic galaxies emerges.
The perception of natural phenomena is the mind feeling natural phenomena being causal-
mechanical phenomena which can be algebraically represented. Based on this perception of 
nature causality shows itself already to be a conception. Descartes recognizes causality already to 
be something semantic, i.e. a representation of nature, and so knows that as a conception it 
cannot be explained in causal-mechanical terms itself. The cause of the conception of causality 
itself cannot be something resembling causality, because that is not the way Descartes feels that 
things work, as voiced by Descartes at the start of Le Monde and explained in the third meditation. 
But Descartes feels, i.e. perceives, it anyway, whatever the nature of perception is, though it is 
certainly not causal-mechanical, but rather an insight by the mind. So Descartes feels himself to be 
part of a thoroughly semantic whole instituted by nature, which is the world in which he is, but at 
the same time feels that he, as a thinking thing (and thinking is first of all feeling, i.e. perceiving, 
and based on that conceiving by the image-forming force), is not of the same substance as the 
things, as extended things, he thinks, though as an extended thing, a body, he is also of the same 
substance.
 See § 2, esp. note 35; see also AT XI p. 346 (article 23 of Les passions de l’ âme).147
 AT VII p. 27-30.148
 AT VII p. 30-31.149
 Again, see also AT XI p. 346: our perception of something is not just our sensation of the movement of our sense 150
organs by its cause, but also what we suppose to be its cause and think to see, hear, etc.
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No wonder Descartes is confused and perceives himself as a confused unity of two 
different substances. In order to perceive and conceive of his own human nature in a clear and 
distinct way he needs to clearly and distinctly separate the two substances, because this is the 
only way in which he feels the truth about human nature can be acquired, because only in this way 
the natural light can illuminate the human mind. The essence of being human is to feel, i.e. 
perceive, the world of which he himself is already a part as the confused unity he is. Then this 
essence is located by Descartes in the thinking substance, but this is a metaphysical act of 
violence, for the mind can only be what it is being in the world in a confused unity with the body. In 
order to know Descartes separates what cannot be separated and takes the Alexandrian solution 
to this Gordian knot: just cut it. This impossible separation is driven by the mirage that the mind 
might overcome nature - and therefore should be independent of it: have its own Archimedean 
Point from which to move the entire cosmos - and be its master and possessor, but the mind is 
what it is as a natural phenomenon, i.e. being in the world of which it is a part as the ingenium.
The difficulty is in Descartes’ conception of a thing (res) or substance itself: this is already 
basically confused, as he acknowledges in the Principia. He defines a substance as something 
which we cannot understand but as a thing which exists in such a way that it does not need 
anything else in order to exist.  Taking this in a strict sense the definition is applicable to God 151
only. We perceive (percipimus) all other substances in need of His cooperation (ope concursus 
Dei) to be able to exist. Therefore the name substance does not convene to God and the other 
substances univocally (univoce). So there is no signification of this name which can be conceived 
distinctly (potest distincte intellegi; French translation: nous concevions distinctement) which is 
common to both God and His creatures.152
Descartes needs the concept of substance to understand the world, for it is the only way in 
which he can clearly and distinctly conceive of himself and the things in the world being there in the 
first place and being a different substance in the second place, which is one aspect of his basic 
perception, as argued before. But now the problem emerges that this concept cannot be univocally 
used, for Descartes has another perception: both he and the things in the world cannot sustain 
their own existence: they are in need of God’s cooperation, for they are creatures.
It is possible to conceive of substances, the thinking and the extended one, in so far as they 
are both created and need God’s cooperation. Because that which is an existing thing on its own 
does not affect us (res existens nos non afficit): we know it through its attributes. This follows from 
the common notion that properties and qualities are not attributed to nothing. So if we perceive 
(percipiamus) the attributes we conclude there necessarily is something (aliquam rem existentem) 
to which they can be attributed.153
Afficere should be read in conjunction with percipere and in the light of Descartes’ basic 
experience: he does not feel what it means to exist, because he is not affected by existence on its 
own. If he wants to know what it means to exist he has to conclude it from the properties and 
qualities of that which exists, because he does perceive these attributes. The first attribute he 
perceives of that which exists is its being created. Only after this he perceives its being thinking or 
being extended as the principal attributes which constitute the nature and essence of a substance 
and of which all other attributes are modes.154
Does this actually solve anything for Descartes? Man is a confused unity of existing 
extended (as a body) and existing thinking (as a mind). Descartes cannot clarify this confusion 
referring to existence itself, for he claims it does not affect him, so he cannot perceive it as such. In 
order to clarify this confusion and to know himself and the world he has to turn to what does affect 
him and what he does perceive: the attributes of truly existing things, i.e. substances: being 
thought or extension and both being created. The clarification is bought at a price: separating what 
 AT VIII p. 24: “Per substantiam nihil aliud intellegere possumus, quam rem quae ita existit, ut nulla alia re indigeat ad 151
existendum.” Compare AT VII p. 44: “substantiam,sive esse rem quae per se apta est existere”. 
 AT VIII p. 24 and AT IX p. 46-47: article 51.152
 AT VIII p. 24-25: article 52.153
 AT VIII p. 25: article 53.154
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cannot be separated. What remains in the dark is what it actually means to be the unity a human 
being is, i.e. feeling the signification of things while your are already a part of this semantic whole. 
Descartes’ solution sacrifices the true essence of being human in order to know and so manipulate 
the world, which is, in fact, him being true to his own rules:
monet enim res omnes per quasdam series posse disponi, non quidem in quantum 
ad aliquod genus entis referuntur, sicut illas Philosophi in categorias suas diviserunt, 
sed in quantum unae ex aliis cognosci possunt (…).155
What things are is irrelevant with an eye to knowledge, as knowledge is just a means to 
another end: command and control of things. This is the Neolithic mirage again. The mirage is 
hidden in the perception of things as being created in the first place. Perceiving everything as 
being created harbours an essential ambiguity itself, as ‘creation’ has the twofold connotation of 
being made, being of a certain make, on the one hand and of growth on the other (crescere: to 
grow). Creation loses its ambiguity with Descartes’ Alexandrian cut of the Gordian knot and 
becomes cultivation and domestication: taming something from what it naturally is to what you 
think it should be. You and your wellbeing are the ratio for domestication. But you can only 
conceive something rationally to be something else than it naturally is if you have already 
perceived the gap between the two. With an eye to the immense micro and macrocosmos it is 
irrelevant what things naturally seem to be in your nearby earthly environment. With an eye to the 
rationally conceivable possibilities to understand and manipulate nature it is irrelevant what things 
naturally are. This is what Descartes realises and what drives his thought. The price he has to pay 
is forgetfulness. The perception of being an integral part of the world and of nature is cast into 
oblivion. One has to forget that it was nature in the first place who set the stage for the experience 
of the gap due to cosmic cycles generating geophysical events having impact on the evolution of 
life. One has to forget that we ourselves are essentially natural phenomena and that all our 
machinations affecting natural phenomena, including ourselves (from socio-economic experiments 
like socialism to biological ones like genetic manipulation), will always have innumerable effects we 
cannot possibly compute and command. Nature takes its own course, whether we understand it or 
not and whether we like it or not and whatever we do to remedy the defects we experience. What 
humans naturally are and what they rationally aspire to be is always determined by nature in a way 
they cannot possibly survey.
Descartes is aware of the price he has to pay when he explains to Elizabeth that the 
primitive notion of the unity of body and soul can only be known through the senses. The primitive 
notions must be met on their own terms. The primitive notion of the body as an extended 
substance is best known through pure reasoning aided by the imagination and so clearly and 
distinctly conceived of by mathematics. The primitive notion of the soul as a thinking substance is 
best known through pure reasoning alone and so clearly and distinctly conceived of by 
metaphysics. As a consequence those who abstain from mathematical and metaphysical studies 
conceive of the unity of body and soul in the best possible way by only making use of the ordinary 
facts of life itself. The unity is the unity every human being experiences in himself without 
philosophising.156
To ask Descartes for a mathematical or metaphysical demonstration of the unity would be 
to ask the impossible of him, for the primitive notions must be met on their own terms, like also 
neither the soul can be exposed in a mechanical-mathematical fashion, nor the body in a 
metaphysical fashion as something behaving rationally, i.e. not being inert. Descartes would 
consider this a methodical mistake, something going against the rules for the direction of the mind.
Descartes explains to Elizabeth to conceive of the unity in the traditional Aristotelian 
fashion: in terms of inherent qualities accounting for the meaningful and purposeful behaviour of 
bodies. Inherent heaviness conjoined to a body accounts for it falling by pushing it purposefully to 
its natural place at the centre of the earth. In this way one can effortlessly conceive of the soul 
moving the body. This notion of inherent qualities and their final causality has been traditionally 
 AT X p. 381.155
 AT III p. 690-695: Descartes to Elizabeth, 28 June 1643.156
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misused to explain natural phenomena, like efficient causality in its turn is misused to explain the 
interaction between body and soul. The Aristotelian conception is however quite apt for the unity of 
body and soul.157
Descartes’ point is to show Elizabeth the inaptitude of efficient causality to explain the unity 
of body and soul behaving in a meaningful and purposeful, i.e. rational, way. A mechanical 
reduction of human rationality is impossible.  Trying to take this reduction as far as possible is 158
exactly his method in Les passions de l’ âme to see what properly belongs to the soul.  The 159
sticking point for him is, as we have seen, the perception not just being a mechanical, i.e. natural, 
phenomenon (as a sensation of movement of the sense organs), but also being a judgment, i.e. 
rational phenomenon (as an insight by the mind).  Rationality implies semantics: the unity of body 160
and soul senses and interprets the signs surrounding it and thinks what things are what it feels 
them to be.
Being human means being semantic.  This is the most basic fact of life, as far as 161
Descartes is concerned. But the only way in which he can clearly and distinctly conceive of it is by 
separating the mechanical and the rational aspects of semantics, because this is what he feels the 
unity to be: a synthesis of two separate creations. Them being put together is the true institution of 
nature and this institution as such cannot be philosophically surveyed, as far as Descartes is 
concerned. The unity is first and foremost a res existens and as such creata and this on its own 
does not affect him and so is not perceived by him. What does affect him and what he does 
perceive are the separate attributes of the res existens: being either extended or thinking and what 
is only extended he feels to be of another substance than he himself is. This is the way in which he 
himself, i.e. his ingenium, is created: feeling the gap between himself and the world, though feeling 
himself being a part of this world at the same time. So the institution of nature has already 
determined what the ingenium is. There is no way in which it is possible to survey and manipulate 
the institution of nature. As the basic fact of life it cannot be undone or changed.
Conclusion.
In various ways I have tried to demonstrate how nature through its institution of the inborn 
constitution (ingenium) has already determined what a human being is (res creata: res cogitans) 
and how he perceives the world (res extensa) and deals with it (the method). However, it is 
impossible for man to survey and control nature, already being its institution. At the same time man 
is led to believe that he can and in chasing this mirage of the control of nature man is forgetting 
what he and nature truly are: the whole of which he already is and always has been a part, the 
whole by which he has already and always been borne. Man is a seedling of nature that thinks it 
can survey and control the earth in which it is rooted, forgetting that it is this very earth that 
supports it while looking into the vast skies.
 AT III p. 663-668: Descartes to Elizabeth, 21 May 1643.157
 Recall my remark in § 1 that “through mechanics the significance and purpose of a functional whole can be explained 158
in terms of the different parts acting effectively on each other”, but this is not a contradiction to my remark above, 
because Descartes would say that the mind perceives and conceives of the significance and purpose of any mechanical 
structure. In the end it is always necessary to invoke the mind perceiving meaning and purpose, i.e. rationality, so the 
structure can be conceived of and explained in a mechanical fashion.
 AT XI p. 328-330: articles 2-5.159
 See especially AT VII p. 23-52 (second and third meditation) and AT XI p. 346 (article 23).160
 Of course, being semantic does not limit itself to human beings, but extends itself to all living beings, since they all 161
display meaningful and purposeful, i.e. rational, behaviour. Descartes also knew this. The popular belief is that Descartes 
regarded animals as machines and lacking a soul, but there are indications in his work that he actually regarded animals 
as having a soul, but just not the kind of soul humans have. For reasons of restrictions in size I will not discuss this topic 
in this thesis.
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The mechanical-algebraical way of thinking is something that comes naturally to humans, 
as Descartes explains. But as an institution of nature it cannot mechanically-algebraically reduce 
nature. Descartes bears witness to this when he uses organic instead of mechanical-mathematical 
terminology to point at the domestication and cultivation of the seeds of the method and the 
science growing from it yielding fruits.  Nature is more like growth than like a machine.162
We still chase the mirage, believing in progress and, following our rational nature, seeking 
technological solutions to everything. The most basic fact of life, that we are an institution of 
nature, does not seem to affect us and is not perceived by us. We still think that our rationality 
places us somehow outside of nature in an Archimedean Point from which to move the world, 
although our rationality is our nature. We cannot perceive our rationality as a natural phenomenon 
itself, even in the face of empirical and formal scientific developments bringing home the point. Our 
own identity is unknown to us: we do not know who we are and do not even know that we do not 
know it.
We are who we are and live the way we live due to the same cosmic events that made us 
live like hunter-gatherers for 100.000 years and ignited the Neolithic Revolution and its sequelae 
10.000 years ago, but we cannot perceive ourselves as transformed and marked by geophysical 
events due to cosmic constellations. As long as we chase the mirage of control of nature we will 
keep forgetting what we truly are.
It will take a radically new way of thinking, a new method, to rethink our human identity and 
what it means to be in the world and be a part of nature. But this is essentially not something we 
can deliberately accomplish and technologically manipulate into being, because the very nature of 
a new way of thinking will be constituted by the perception and experience of the control of nature 
as a mirage, nature being something impossible to survey and being that by which we are borne. 
Somehow it will have to grow from within.
Epilogue.
This MA-thesis hopes to convey what I have written in the introduction and conclusion. Descartes 
feels nature to be inert. Natural phenomena have no identity and significance of their own, just the 
one I, as the ego cogito, feel them to have. But me feeling the identity and significance of 
phenomena is, as Descartes also says, already an institution of nature and as such a natural 
phenomenon. So I cannot be the ego cogito in control of everything, because myself perceiving to 
be the ego cogito is bearing witness to me already being a participant in the game of nature, the 
rules of which were not written by me. Descartes’ thought is the road along which I tried to clarify it 
and tried to make it felt. As such this thesis is not so much meant as a very small contribution to 
Descartes-scholarship, but as a very modest attempt at original thinking. Whether I have 
succeeded or not is not for me to decide. I also acknowledge that there are many loose ends in this 
thesis, many footnotes bearing witness to this, pointing out many relations to other thinkers only 
sketchily. I have said virtually nothing about the Ancient Greek experience of the world versus the 
Modern one and why exactly Aristotle’s thought came into decay and so cleared room for 
Descartes’, as I have said virtually nothing or just sketchily something about the philosophical 
consequences of Descartes, for thinkers like Nietzsche, Yorck von Wartenburg and Heidegger 
sense the problems of the method in understanding what life, nature and human beings are, while 
the analytic tradition of Frege and Russell c.s. and the work in the foundations of mathematics by 
Hilbert, Gödel and Turing c.s. rather seem to radicalize it. I would very much like to extend this MA-
thesis in a PhD-thesis, working out the loose ends and beyond in exploring new ways of thinking.
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